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Abstract--Smart Grid technology appears necessary to succeed 
in activating the demand through demand side management 
(DSM) programs. This would in turn improve energy efficiency 
and achieve environmental targets through controlled 
consumption. The many pilot projects led worldwide involving 
smart grids technology, brought quantitative evaluations of DSM 
measures on electricity load. Efficient DSM instruments must be 
fine tuned to respond to very specific issues arising from the 
generation mix, the integration of intermittent energies or the 
level of outage risks faced during peak period.  
 
 Efficient DSM strategies are illustrated through a model 
involving five countries that carry these different features and 
under the assumptions of isolated and fully interconnected 
markets. This paper aims at bringing recommendations 
regarding the instruments that should be implemented to 
maximize the benefits of smart grids technology and demand 
response. Finally, it tends to emphasis the issue of homogenized 
energy efficiency policies, critical in the building of internal 
energy markets such as the one the European Union is 
envisioning. 
 
Index Terms-- Demand-Side Management; Dynamic Pricing; 
Generation Mix; Isolated Market; Integrated market. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Energy efficiency is one of the means of achieving the 
targets set by the European Union. The development of smart 
grids (SG) is a possible solution for achieving these goals [1]. 
Through their deployment all the players in the electricity 
supply chain could contribute to system security and stability, 
with gains subsequently distributed between them. Currently, 
retail consumers have no way of interacting with the system. 
Their passiveness is explained by both the fixed rates and the 
lack of technical ways for price signal to be sent [2]. In the 
United States 98% of peak demand is not in a position to adapt 
its consumption patterns to scarcity conditions [3]. This matter 
is seen as one of the key structural problems in electricity 
markets [4]. The activation of demand would become a source 
of flexibility when balancing supply and demand. 
Deploying SG technology should consequently restore the 
missing link between the system and consumers and enhance 
the system efficiency . Modernization of distribution networks 
and metering technology is opening the way for new energy 
packages and prices, with in particular greater scope for 
controlling and managing demand. A generation bid may thus 
be replaced by load-shedding or shifting, which can be sold on 
the market [5], [6]. Many pilot studies have been carried out to 
study demand response (DR) in the US and more recently in 
Europe [7]-[9]. The initial conclusions suggest that peak load-
shedding may be significant [10]. Demand elasticity affects 
both the cost of energy (energy efficiency) and efforts to 
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions (environmental efficiency).  
 
We will first focus on the use of price signals to elicit a 
demand response from the retail market. We shall show that 
these signals do allow demand to be managed with consumers 
responding to price signals. As has often been observed, 
deploying several information or price-based tools yields the 
best results. In the second part we present a quantitative study 
of gains in energy and environmental efficiency linked to 
demand-side management. We shall see that these gains 
depend in particular on the generation technologies being used 
and on the energy policies limiting changes in the mix. 
 
II.  DEMAND RESPONSE AND RETAIL CONSUMERS 
Deploying smart-grid technology is a key component in the 
development of demand-side management schemes. As 
underlined by many authors [10]-[16] demand response (DR) 
can yield significant economic and environmental gains. 
Demand response techniques may be divided into two main 
categories: voluntary load management by consumers 
themselves through dynamic pricing; and automatic systems 
controlled by a third parties [17]. 
 
A. Demand-response instruments for retail consumers 
Time-of-use (ToU) pricing breaks down the day into set 
periods of time, each associated with a specific, predetermined 
price. This is the simplest and most commonly used form of 
dynamic pricing. However it only allows limited flexibility, 
often with only slight differences between baseline and peak 
periods [18]. Critical-peak pricing (CPP) responds to the 
criticism regarding flexibility. It is based on the same 
principles as ToU but segments periods with a finer mesh 
(baseline, peak and several critical-peak periods). A warning 
signal is sent to consumers alerting them to a critical-peak 
period. Real-time pricing (RTP) transmits variations in the 
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wholesale price per kWh to consumers. Peak-time rebate 
(PTR) systems differ from the others: rather than being based 
on the principle of a surcharge for peak consumption, PTR 
rewards a drop in consumption for such periods, in relation to 
the baseline load curve. 
 For such pricing systems to be widely deployed residential 
premises must be equipped with smart meters able to measure, 
record and charge the rate stipulated by the pricing scheme. 
Alongside smart meters, smart technologies are being 
developed, ultimately leading to the appearance of smart 
spaces capable of managing their electricity requirements 
optimally, using remote-management or direct load-control 
(DLC) systems.   
 
B. Dynamic pricing and load reductions 
Broadcasting information is a critical factor in the success 
of any DR scheme. Various studies have shown that just the 
presence of in-home displays (IHD), or interfaces, could 
constitute an incentive to change consumption patterns. The 
study by Faruqui et al, 2010a shows that their impacts in 
reducing demand range from 1.8% to 6.7% on average [8]. 
Applying both IHD communication and dynamic pricing 
increases these results as the pilot carried out by Hydro One, 
Ontario, suggests. It revealed IHD + ToU could lead to a 7.3% 
peak load reduction. This conclusion differs substantially from 
the result obtained by transmitting information (brochure or 
mail-shot). Schemes simply informing consumers, tested in 
California, were not a sufficient inducement to achieve load-
reduction [19]. 
 
California provides a complete example of experimentation 
with DSM. The studies carried out by Faruqui et al. (2008), 
and by Wolak, (2006) on pilot schemes in this state, revealed 
that a combination of pricing and warning signals (CPP and 
PTR) has an impact three to seven times greater on reducing 
peak consumption than a ToU pricing system [19], [20]. 
The study led by Faruqui et al, (2010b) which compiled the 
results of 28 pilot schemes carried out by 15 utilities in the US 
and Canada, revealed similar results, which summarized 
below in Table I [9]. This study shows that the average load 
reduction with ToU is 4%. Higher results – 13% and 17% – 
were obtained with more complex, PTR or CPP schemes, 
respectively. Lastly, the use of advanced technology such as 
smart thermostats coupled with IHDs proved essential to 
induce more substantial reductions in load. This combination 
doubled the average peak-hour reduction with CPP, and 
showed a six fold gain on comparable consumption with ToU 
(down by 36% and 26% respectively). 
 
TABLE I 
Impact on load of pricing and smart technologies in 28 pilot 
schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number of 
observations 
Average drop in 
peak load 
ToU 5 4% 
ToU + smart 
technology 
4 26% 
PTR 3 13% 
CPP 8 17% 
CPP + smart 
technology 
8 36% 
Source: Faruqui et al. (2010b) [9]. 
 
Regarding RTP, theoretical research concludes that 
deploying RTP at all retail sites would achieve ‘optimum 
allocation with no deadweight loss’ [15]. However empirical 
experiments indicate only limited success with RTP, it being 
too complicated for consumers to manage [13]. Coupling RTP 
with a load-management technology and signalling is one way 
of overcoming this shortcoming. With automation, consumers 
can set a threshold price above which their marginal 
propensity to consume is zero and leave it up to the operator to 
control their consumption automatically in real time. This 
combination was tested as part of a pilot scheme in Austria 
[21]. In this instance the impact of RTP was twice as high on 
peak-demand days than at periods subject to less stress (10% 
and 5.3% respectively). Secondly an RTP + control system 
boosted the results to 16.2% and 7.3%, respectively. 
An earlier study described DLC as the best instrument for 
reducing the peak load of residential consumers [10]. Tthis 
study estimated that peak consumption in the US could 
probably be cut by 5%. This reduction would represent an 
annual gain of between $8bn and $13bn, of which $5bn to 
$10bn would be due to a drop in the short term price of 
energy. The difference represents long-term gains yielded by 
avoided investment in additional generation and transmission-
distribution capacity.  
The same methodology was used for the European market 
[22]. This study was unable to estimate the short-term 
economic gains yielded by demand response, but it did show 
that Europe could realistically reduce peak demand by 8% to 
10% simply through pricing. Deployment of load-control 
technology coupled with dynamic pricing would cut peak 
demand by 12% to 19%.  
 
Lastly, although a reduction in load automatically permits 
an instantaneous drop in generation, these studies do not 
provide any indication of the effect of shifting demand. 
Indeed, consumers may respond to a price variation in two 
ways: either by a net reduction in consumption; or by delaying 
usage [23]. The greater the load-shedding, the more delayed 
consumption must be controlled and spread over several 
hours. If all the consumption halted by load-shedding is 
simply shifted to off-peak hours then the efficiency gains 
expected of DSM will be seriously reduced [24]   
 
An optimal choice of demand-side management tools is 
required, making allowance for their respective advantages 
and bringing them into line with real needs and the technology 
mix of the country or region in which they are deployed, the 
priority goal being to reduce costs. 
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III.  DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT : ILLUSTRATION WITH FIVE 
COUNTRIES 
 
Our example with five countries studies the impact of 
demand-side management on generation costs and 
greenhouse-gas emissions. We have modelled five separate 
countries, each equipped with its own generation resources 
with specific costs for each generation technology1 (Appendix 
1). 
 
We have assumed there are two periods of consumption: a 
peak period, at 19.00 (7pm), and an off-peak period, at 04.00 
(4am). Appendix 2 gives the net consumption values for these 
two periods.  
A tonne of CO2 is valued at €14.18 (Bluenext value on 17 
January 2011 corresponding to the period of consumption 
covered by our study). Appendix 3 shows the contribution of 
each generation technology to carbon emissions.  
 
The various countries are looking for ways of minimizing 
overall costs, while balancing supply and demand. The 
optimization programme here aims to minimize total 
generation costs for each country, as a function of the quantity 
produced to serve domestic demand. 
 
We asume installed capacity can never achieve full output. 
Allowance is made for the available production factors as a 
function of a technology’s installed capacity Kij (see Appendix 
3). 
 
In the absence of interconnections each country can only 
draw on its own generation capacity to balance market supply 
and demand. Table II details marginal generation resources 
enlisted during the peak and off-peak hours covered by the 
study. In this context, we may distinguish two groups. The 
first comprises Spain, the Netherlands and Germany. Their 
installed and available (particularly fossil-fuel) capacity is 
sufficiently large to satisfy domestic consumption. During 
peak hour, wind and nuclear energy in Spain and the 
Netherlands respectively are not retained in the merit order 
because of their cost. Similarly Germany does not use its oil-
fired critical-peak power plants. The second group comprises 
Belgium and France, which are subject to stress because they 
use all their available generation resources. Indeed Belgium 
has a power shortage and cannot balance its market. 
 
TABLE II 
Results of supply/demand balance - Separate countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 Data on the cost of generation are the private property of firms. It is 
consequently difficult to observe or calculate such data. The cost here is an 
approximation based on available data relating to the Capex, Opex and load 
factor figures for each country. The values are the authors’ own estimates. 
 
 Marginal 
generation cos tat 
19.00 (€/MWh) 
Marginal 
generation cos tat 
04.00 (€/MWh) 
Spain 33 (gas) 33 (gas) 
Netherlands 22 (gas) 22 (gas) 
Germany 43 (coal) 43 (coal) 
France 168 (oil) 22 (nuclear) 
Belgium Indeterminate 
(VOLL) 
24 (gas) 
 
This baseline situation shows that all the countries would 
gain by applying DSM, some to reduce their emissions, others 
to reduce stress on their electricity system. So, for each 
country we calculated the total cost of supplying energy for 
various scenarios regarding the generation mix coupled with 
DSM, with demand shifted or not to off-peak hours. Unless 
stipulated, the volume of load-shifting is always equal to the 
full amount of peak-hour load-shedding. The calculated total 
cost will be made up of the sum of the total cost of energy and 
CO2 over the two periods under study. 
 
A.  Demand response and  stress on the electricity system 
France balances peak supply and demand by using its oil-
fired power stations, at a high financial (€168 per MWh) and 
environmental cost. On the other hand hydraulic and nuclear 
(€22 per MWh) power stations cater for off-peak demand, at a 
low cost and with no emissions. The total cost (baseline) to 
serve demand over the two periods is €15,319,979.  
A 2% load-shedding results in positive balance (Table III), 
avoiding the need to draw on oil-fired plant, with gas-fired 
plant balancing the system. The overall cost is reduced by 
29.1%. The result would be even better if 10% load-shedding 
could be achieved, with a 52.9% saving on the overall cost. 
There no longer being any need for oil or gas-fired plant at 
peak hours, coal-fired plant costing €50 per MWh can be used 
to balance supply and demand. With 10% load-shedding there 
is only marginal coal-fired generation. On the other hand, 
higher load-shedding (17%) substantially reduces the cost at 
peak load, but load-shifting only yields a 27.9% saving, in 
other words a meagre gain compared with only 2% shedding. 
Load-shifting has a major impact on the cost of energy (the 
marginal power plant being gas-fired, at a cost of €113 per 
MWh) and on emissions (with coal-fired plants operating at 
full capacity in addition to the marginal gas plant). Substantial 
load-shedding should therefore be followed by graduated 
shifting. 
TABLE III  
Impact of load-shedding and shifting on costs for France 
Shifted load 
(%) 
Cut in 
energy 
cost (%) 
Cut in 
emissions cost 
CO2 (%) 
Overall cut in 
cost (%) 
2 29.2 13 29.1 
10 52.9 37.5 52.8 
17 27.8 38.5 27.9 
 
Load-shedding thus improves generation and environmental 
efficiency even though all the load that is shed is ultimately 
just delayed. On the other hand a strategy involving the 
greatest possible load-shedding only yields optimal results 
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with a low reconnection rate. In the case of full reconnection it 
is not optimal at all. Shedding 2% of the load can be more 
efficient and does not involve deploying sophisticated 
instruments. In fact good information broadcasting can 
achieve the same result [22] On the other hand, more 
substantial shedding, in the range of 10% to 17%, requires the 
introduction of more complex measures, combining CPP or 
RTP with information and/or control instruments.  
 
The situation in Belgium is more worrying, as it is unable to 
satisfy peak demand exclusively with its own resources (Table 
II). By shedding 5% of the load the market can be balanced. 
We used this point of balance as a baseline in the following 
tables to calculate the gains derived from additional load-
shedding, a measure which is profitable and necessary for the 
market to function. With load-shedding at this level, peak 
demand is balanced thanks to oil-fired plant (€164 per MWh). 
The overall cost, or baseline, to cater for peak and off-peak 
demand is €2,041,887. 
The most effective level of load-shedding corresponds to 
roughly 13% of demand (Table IV). This level yields 
substantial efficiency gains even in the event of subsequent 
load reconnection (51.5% cut in overall costs). Oil-fired plant 
previously used to meet critical-peak demand would no longer 
generate power at peak hours, yielding a significant cut in 
energy costs. Furthermore load reconnection only has a slight 
impact on off-peak energy costs and emissions (only limited 
coal-fired generation is required). With 5% of demand shifted 
to 04.00 there is an increase in the cost of energy and in 
emissions. During off-peak hours hydraulic power (€25 per 
MWh) takes over as the marginal plant, with gas-fired plants 
operating at full capacity, boosting CO2 emissions. Shedding 
21% of the load also cuts both the cost of energy and 
emissions, but if all demand is simply shifted to off-peak 
hours there is no gain in efficiency because of the high cost of 
fossil-fuel plant operating at that time. 
 
TABLE IV 
Impact on costs of shedding more than 5% of the load, in part 
shifted 
Load-
shedding at 
19.00 (%) 
Reduction in 
energy cost 
(%) 
Cut in 
emissions cost 
CO2 (%) 
Overall 
reduction in 
cost (%) 
13 66.4 
 
15.4 64.7 
21 74.4 31.9 73 
5% shifted to 
4.00 
-1.1 -0.6 -1.1 
13% shifted 
to 4.00 
53.3 1.6 51.5 
21% shifted 
to 4.00 
-3.4 3.8 -3.1 
 
Here again, there is no call for major incentive measures to 
shift 5% of the load, thus balancing supply and demand. On 
the other hand much more work will be required to change the 
marginal power plant (in the event of load-shedding ranging 
from 13% to 21%). As in the previous case this would involve 
the use of several incentives and information instruments. 
However it would not be ideal to shed a substantial share of 
demand unless the impact of shifting is spread over several 
hours.    
 
B.  Demand response and environmental efficiency  
These countries have substantial generation capacity at their 
disposal to serve peak demand. They are thus able to balance 
peak supply and demand, but each MWh comes at a high cost 
in emissions. There seems little scope here for reducing 
consumption in order to bring down the unit cost of energy 
due to the scale of fossil-fuel capacity. On the other hand, 
measures enabling generation with more environmentally 
friendly technologies could be worthwhile, thanks to the cut in 
emissions. 
Spain has two ways of reducing overall generation costs: to 
give priority to developing wind power; and to deploy DSM 
measures. Shifting peak-generation from gas-fired plants to 
wind farms, despite a higher unit cost (see Appendix 1) would 
reduce the cost of CO2 emissions. The extra cost of wind 
power could then be reduced by shedding 15.3% of demand. 
We have taken as a baseline the total cost, without wind 
power, of €2,321,114 for serving both consumption periods. 
 
We studied two scenarios for introducing wind power. In 
the first case its introduction follows a conventional pattern, 
the price of wind power being equal to the marginal price (€41 
per MWh). In the second scenario we assumed a premium-
type system, which enables renewable-energy generators to 
recover, at least, the difference between the market price and 
their overall costs (the market price of the marginal power 
plant remains that of gas, €33 per MWh).  
The introduction of wind-powered generation entails an 
increase in the overall cost, in all the scenarios, except with a 
premium system without load-shifting, which yields efficiency 
gains (see Table V). The gains derived from lower CO2 
emissions compensate the excess cost entailed by the premium 
incentive mechanism. Demand control improves results, but in 
so far as possible it should not involve all the load that is shed 
being shifted to off-peak hours, as the marginal plants burn 
fossil fuel. Shifting consumption to off-peak hours would 
certainly not impact on the unit cost of energy but it would 
increase CO2 emissions for that period, leading to a drop in 
efficiency. 
 
TABLE V 
Impact of load-shedding on overall costs compared with the 
initial (baseline) situation 
 Cut in total 
cost without 
DSM (%) 
Cut in total 
cost with 
15.3% DSM 
(%) 
Cut in total 
cost with 
15.3% DSM 
shifted at 
4.00 (%) 
Without 
including wind 
power 
Baseline : 
total cost of 
€2,321,114 
10.1 0 
Including wind 
power 
-19.3 -7.1 -10.1 
With wind 
power and 
premium 
-1.3 9.9 -1.2 
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By managing demand (shifted or not) gains in 
environmental and energy efficiency can be achieved. As 
these gains mainly concern greenhouse-gas emissions, 
efficiency increases with the scale of DSM deployed. If the 
load is simply shifted, efficiency suffers, as the marginal 
plants burn fossil fuel. The best combination of solutions for 
substantially cutting demand would be dynamic pricing with 
control and information systems.  
Exactly the same reasoning and conclusions apply to the 
Netherlands as to Spain, with fossil-fuel marginal plants and 
carbon-free (nuclear and wind-power) resources which are 
both costly and insufficient in number to offer a plausible 
alternative to gas-fired resources.  
On the other hand, Germany differs from Spain and the 
Netherlands in that it uses all its carbon-free resources to 
balance peak supply and demand. A DSM strategy is fully 
operative in this instance, allowing reduced use of coal-fired 
plants. With coal-fired generation serving 48% of demand, 
extensive load-shedding would be required to change the 
marginal generation technology. As a result any load-shedding 
contributes to reducing CO2 emissions. But, of course, simply 
shifting this demand to off-peak hours would cancel any gains, 
the marginal power plants being coal-fired. 
A scenario in which Germany gives up the use of nuclear 
power would substantially alter these conclusions. With no 
nuclear power, the gas and oil-fired peaking plants (costing 
respectively €113 and €164 per MWh) would be required to 
serve peak demand, raising energy and emissions costs. Under 
these circumstances DSM could have a positive impact on 
both emissions and the cost of energy. We have consequently 
analysed the eventuality of Germany decommissioning its 
nuclear plants, with two scenarios for controlling demand: 
3.45% load-shedding to avoid using oil-fired plants (the peak-
hour marginal power plant would be gas-fired); and 14% load-
shedding to end the use of gas-fired resources (the peak-hour 
marginal power plant would be coal-fired). The total cost of 
generation under the scenario with nuclear power would be 
€6,586,119, whereas without nuclear power it would be 
€16,646,209.  
Even with demand being shifted, DSM would reduce overall 
costs (see Table VI). The impact of DSM is of course greater 
in the scenario without nuclear power, because the very 
expensive oil and gas-fired marginal plants would be replaced 
by their coal-fired counterparts, resulting in higher emissions 
but much lower costs. The emissions balance-sheet is 
nevertheless negative because coal-fired resources would be 
used for off-peak hours, taking over from the gas and oil-fired 
peak plants.  
 
TABLE VI 
Impact of DSM on total costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cut in total 
cost with 
3.45% DSM 
without 
shifting (%) 
Cut in total 
cost with 
14% DSM 
without 
shifting (%) 
Cut in total 
cost with 
3.45% 
DSM 
shifted at 
4.00 (%) 
Cut in total 
cost with 
14% DSM 
shifted at 
4.00 (%) 
With 
nuclear 
power 
3.1 10.3 0 0 
Without 
nuclear 
power 
26.5 61.4 25.6 57.6 
 
If nuclear power is retained, DSM without load-shifting 
only impacts on emissions but not on the unit cost of energy, 
because the same marginal plant is used. If demand is simply 
shifted it cancels out any gains, the same (coal-fired) marginal 
plants operating off-peak as at peak hours. On the other hand, 
without nuclear power DSM would have greater effect, 
yielding a significant cut in the unit cost of energy.  However 
this effect is limited if demand is simply shifted, due to the 
higher CO2 emissions at off-peak hours. To maintain the 
balance of supply and demand, without the support of nuclear 
power, Germany would need to introduce substantial (14%) 
DSM in order to avoid an increase in the unit cost of energy 
and to contain emissions. If so, deploying demand control with 
dynamic pricing and a high-performance information system 
would be a useful addition to other possible measures such as 
increasing use of gas or renewables combined cycles.  
 
C.  An interconnected market with no limit on capacity 
At this point we introduced the possibility for each country 
to trade as much energy with its neighbours as it wished. 
Under the present European Union merit order, German coal-
fired power plants (with a €43 per MWh generation cost) 
would be used to serve aggregate demand at peak hours. 
Spanish gas-fired plants, costing €33 per MWh, would balance 
supply and demand at off-peak hours. As may be expected this 
situation leads to increased generation efficiency compared 
with the previous case. 
Costs can be improved and optimized by managing active 
demand. A 17% reduction in demand could be achieved if 
Germany continued using nuclear power, providing for a 
reduction in the cost of energy (the marginal resource would 
be Spanish wind power costing €41 per MWh) but also a 
significant drop in the cost of emissions (table VII). To 
achieve this level of load-shedding, countries could pool their 
efforts. To achieve a 17% cross-the-board reduction in peak 
demand it would be necessary to deploy powerful information 
systems and incentive instruments (critical-peak or real-time 
pricing), backed by load control by suppliers, TSOs or DSOs. 
Whereas national strategies only involved basic measures to 
reduce or shift demand, a collective strategy would require 
direct investment in complex systems for implementing and 
managing load-shedding.  
Over and above 77% shifting of demand to off-peak hours 
after load-shedding, any reduction in the cost of energy would 
be counter-balanced by the use of additional plants during off-
peak hours. Load-shifting on this scale would entail additional 
costs in terms of energy but not necessarily for CO2 emissions, 
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due to the use of more costly wind power. Load-shedding 
strategies would be beneficial, all the more so if the timing or 
volume of reconnections were controlled to prevent simply 
shifting peak consumption.  
The results would be significantly different if Germany 
phased out nuclear power. DSM under 4.57% would have no 
impact on the cost of energy, because even with a switch in 
marginal resources (Belgian and Spanish plants are 
interchangeable), the cost would be the same.  
 
TABLE VII 
Impact of DSM on overall costs in an interconnected space 
with unlimited transit 
 Total 
baseline 
cost (€) 
Shedding 
of demand 
at 19.00 
(%) 
Reduction 
in total 
cost 
without 
shifting 
(%) 
Reduction 
in total 
cost with 
shifting 
(%) 
With 
German 
nuclear 
power 
16,469,689 17 16 -48 
Without 
German 
nuclear 
power 
18,676,161 
4.57 7 3 
5.8 9 4 
25.1 51 31 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Managing demand through various pricing and information 
systems provides a way of reducing consumption at peak 
hours. The various experiments cited here show that several 
instruments are better suited to high levels of load-shedding. 
But such measures upset market equilibrium and change CO2 
emissions.  
The positive or negative impacts of such changes depend on 
the extent of load-shedding, the generation mix and the 
volume of demand-shifting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A simple example corroborates these results. Deploying 
energy-efficiency measures and incentives naturally leads to 
an improvement of the situation in the various countries 
covered by our study. The scale of the measures required to 
control demand and shed the corresponding load depends on 
both the generation mix and the gap between supply and 
demand. Demand-shifting is optimal when it is spread over 
several off-peak hours, the costs of energy and emissions 
being diluted over this period, which limits their scale. If the 
full load is simply shifted to a specific time later on – the 
result of uncontrolled reconnection of load shed – the various 
situations reveal a real difference regarding the cost of energy 
and emissions. There is also a change in the marginal power 
resources serving off-peak demand, raising the cost of energy-
generation and emissions when a majority of fossil-fuel 
resources are used.  
These examples highlight the DSM policies best suited to 
isolated countries. The countries where a delicate balance 
prevails, powered by low-emissions generation, should give 
priority to simple demand-side management tools. On the 
other hand, it seems that countries hampered by high 
emissions, albeit without any serious risk of failure, should opt 
for the more complex (and expensive) pricing and control 
tools.  
However a substantially different conclusion emerges, if the 
scope of the present exercise is enlarged to define an optimal 
DSM policy for a situation in which these countries are not 
only interconnected but also bound by EU-wide energy-
efficiency targets. In this case a common goal takes priority 
over national goals, with 17% being the optimal level of DSM 
if Germany retains its nuclear power plants, dropping to no 
less than 4.57% in the eventuality of Germany phasing out 
nuclear power. The latter measure would entail increased use 
of marginal, coal-fired plants, but more extensive DSM would 
limit the need for such resources, with a corresponding impact 
on the unit cost of energy and emissions. 
 
 
 
 
V.  APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Electricity generation capacities and costs in various European countries in 2010 
Country j Spain Netherlands Germany France Belgium 
generation 
technology 
i  
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
€/MWh 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
€/MWh 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
€/MWh 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
€/MWh 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Cost 
€/MWh 
Gas 33,465.
40 33 23,270 22 
9,810 113 
7,497 116 5,985 24 Combined 
cycles 12,000 30 
Oil 6,436 164 789 164 5,856 164 13,244 168 1,340 164 
Coal 12,070 47 3,346 44 52,837 43 7,257 50 1,195 47 
Wind 20,676 41 2,449 37 27,157 39 6,080 37 912 34 
Hydro 
(peak) 5,350 29 - - 6,470 29 5,100 27 1,310 25 
Hydro 
(baseline) 13,020 15 37 15 4,550 15 20,570 13 110 15 
Nuclear 7,450 23 482 23 20,467 23 63,130 22 5,830 23 
Total 98,467  30,373  127,147  122,879  16,683  
 Sources: IEA (2012) [25] and authors’ data. 
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Appendix 2: Consumption (Cj) on 19 January 2011 in each country (MWh) 
Period Spain Netherlands Germany France Belgium 
19.00 39,694 16,826 79,863 82,450 13,881 
04.00 24,934 9,898 54,635 60,536 10,002 
Source: Data provided by ENTSO-E 
 
 
Appendix 3: Available generation and CO2 emissions for each generation technology 
generation technology Available generation (MWh) CO2 emissions  (tCO2/MWh) 
Coal 0.85*KCoal 0.96 
Gas 0.85*KGas 0.4 
Combined cycle 0.85*KCombined_cycles 0.36 
Oil 0.85*KOil 0.8 
Wind 0.3*KWind 0 
Hydro  0.5*KHydro 0 
Nuclear 0.85*KNuclear 0 
 Sources: EIA, 2010 [26] 
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